Bio
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. He earned his PhD (2022) and MA (2018) in Computer Science from Princeton University and his BS in Computer Engineering (2016) from the Federal University of Itajubá. His research interests include AI, Algorithmic Economics and Security. He applies artificial intelligence, optimization and theoretical computer science tools to create secure, transparent, and auditable platforms. For instance, he designs auctions that prevent auctioneers from profiting from manipulations.
He has been recognized with several awards, including the CNS Prize for Excellence in Networking from UC, San Diego (2014), the Dean’s Grand from Princeton Graduate School (2016-2021), the LATinE Fellowship (2020) from Purdue College of Engineering, and the Award for Excellence from Princeton School of Engineering (2020). Matheus hails from Itabira, the Brazilian capital of poetry.
Upcoming Events
June 14, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative
June 6-9, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering, Philadelphia
June 20-23, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at STOC 2023, Orlando, FL
July 19, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at CryptoEconDay, Paris
Fall, 2023: I will be a Research Member at Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute, Berkeley, CA
January 2-5, 2024: I will be speaking at Young Workshop on Economics and Computation, Tel-Aviv, Israel
TBD: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at International Association for Quantitative Finance, New York City
Past Events
May 22, 2023: I presented Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains at the Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop
May 18, 2023: I was a panelist at Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis organized by De Gruyter
May 16, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at the Research Day at the Metrograph, New York City
April 20, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at the Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum’s symposium
April 19, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar
April 10-13, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Princeton University, DeCenter Seminar
March 19-21, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at the University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
Feb 28, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Tufts University, Department of Computer Science
Feb 20, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science
Feb 15-17, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar
December 12-13, 2022: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at Tokenomics, 2022, Sorbonne Université, France
November 4, 2022: I presented Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at Harvard University, EconCS Seminar
November 4, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series
October 31 to November 2, 2022: I presented Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at the UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference
October 18, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at INFORMS
September 21-25, 2022: I presented Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems at RIT, Department of Computer Science
July 11-15, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at ACM EC 2022, University of Colorado, Boulder
June 21, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Ripple Labs
February 11, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar
December 15, 2021: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Spotlights Beyond WINE
September 26, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at ACM AFT 2021
July 22, 2021. I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at ACM EC 2021
July 23, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at the 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
March 10, 2021. I presented Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems at Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group, Redmond
May 5, 2020. I presented Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments at Princeton research day.
Winning presentation