Bio

Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. He earned his PhD (2022) and MA (2018) in Computer Science from Princeton University and his BS in Computer Engineering (2016) from the Federal University of Itajubá. His research interests include AI, Algorithmic Economics and Security. He applies artificial intelligence, optimization and theoretical computer science tools to create secure, transparent, and auditable platforms. For instance, he designs auctions that prevent auctioneers from profiting from manipulations.

He has been recognized with several awards, including the CNS Prize for Excellence in Networking from UC, San Diego (2014), the Dean’s Grand from Princeton Graduate School (2016-2021), the LATinE Fellowship (2020) from Purdue College of Engineering, and the Award for Excellence from Princeton School of Engineering (2020). Matheus hails from Itabira, the Brazilian capital of poetry.

[Curriculum Vitae]

Upcoming Events

• June 14, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative

• June 6-9, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering, Philadelphia

• June 20-23, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at STOC 2023, Orlando, FL

• July 19, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at CryptoEconDay, Paris

• Fall, 2023: I will be a Research Member at Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute, Berkeley, CA

• January 2-5, 2024: I will be speaking at Young Workshop on Economics and Computation, Tel-Aviv, Israel

• TBD: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at International Association for Quantitative Finance, New York City

Past Events

• May 22, 2023: I presented Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains at the Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop

• May 18, 2023: I was a panelist at Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis organized by De Gruyter

• May 16, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at the Research Day at the Metrograph, New York City

• April 20, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at the Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum’s symposium

• April 19, 2023: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar

• April 10-13, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Princeton University, DeCenter Seminar

• March 19-21, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at the University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science

• Feb 28, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Tufts University, Department of Computer Science

• Feb 20, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science

• Feb 15-17, 2023: I presented “Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics” at Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar

• December 12-13, 2022: I presented Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at Tokenomics, 2022, Sorbonne Université, France

• November 4, 2022: I presented Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at Harvard University, EconCS Seminar

• November 4, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series

• October 31 to November 2, 2022: I presented Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at the UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference

• October 18, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at INFORMS

• September 21-25, 2022: I presented Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems at RIT, Department of Computer Science

• July 11-15, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at ACM EC 2022, University of Colorado, Boulder

• June 21, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Ripple Labs

• February 11, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar

• December 15, 2021: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Spotlights Beyond WINE

• September 26, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at ACM AFT 2021

• July 22, 2021. I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at ACM EC 2021

• July 23, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at the 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation

• March 10, 2021. I presented Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems at Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group, Redmond

• May 5, 2020. I presented Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments at Princeton research day. Winning presentation