Bio
Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. He holds a PhD (2022) and a MA (2018) in Computer Science from Princeton University and a BS in Computer Engineering (2016) from the Federal University of Itajubá. His primary research interests are in market design, algorithmic economics, cryptography, and information security. He is particularly interested in how one can build trust by building platforms that have the incentive to follow their own specification. For example, auctions are the main building block of how we transact on eBay or how Google sells advertising; however, it is impossible to know whether or not a self-interested auctioneer is also shill bidding, i.e., bidding in their auction with a fake identity. His research shows this kind of manipulation is not inevitable, and one can design auctions that are credible by design.
His honors include a CNS Prize for Excellence in Networking from UC, San Diego (2014), a Dean’s Grand from Princeton Graduate School (2016-2021), a LATinE Fellowship (2020) from Purdue College of Engineering, and an Award for Excellence from Princeton School of Engineering (2020). Matheus is from Itabira, which is known as the Brazilian capital of poetry.
I’m in the job market for 2023
Upcoming Events
Feb 15-17, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at CMU, Pittsburgh.
Feb 20, 2023: I will be presenting at The University of Sydney, Australia.
June 6-9, 2023: I will be presenting Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance mini symposium during SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering, Philadelphia.
Past Events
December 12-13, 2023: Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules at Tokenomics, 2022, Sorbonne Université, France
November 4, 2022: Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at Harvard EconCS Seminar.
November 4, 2022: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series.
October 31 to November 2, 2022: I will be presenting Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules at the Crypto Economics Security Conference, UC Berkeley.
October 18, 2022: I will be presenting Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at INFORMS (TA65. Economics and Computation I, 8:00 AM-9:15 AM).
September 21 - 25, 2022: I was selected for the Rochester Institute of Technology Future Faculty Career Exploration Program. On September 22, I gave the talk Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems.
July 11-15, 2022: I presented Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake at ACM EC 2022 which took place in Boulder, Colorado.
June 21, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Ripple Labs.
February 11, 2022: I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at Harvard Theory of Computation Seminar.
December 15, 2021: I was invited to give a Spotlights Beyond WINE talk on the paper Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness.
September 26, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at ACM AFT 2021.
July 22, 2021. I presented Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness at ACM EC 2021.
July 23, 2021. I presented Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market at the 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation.
March 10, 2021. I gave the talk Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems at Microsoft Research, Redmond.
May 5, 2020. I talked about Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments at Princeton research day.
Winning presentation