Research Interests

Economics and Computation, Security, Blockchains, AI

Education

Princeton University Princeton, NJ, USA

Master of Arts in Computer Science 2018

Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science 2022

Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg

Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems

Universidade Federal de Itajubá Itabira, MG, Brazil

B.S. (first class) in Computer Engineering 2016

University of California, San Diego San Diego, CA, USA

Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship 2014

Appointments

University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA, USA

Assistant Professor of Computer Science July 2024 - Present

Harvard University Boston, MA, USA

Lecturer in Computer Science Fall 2023

Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science Fall 2021 - Summer 2024

Fellow in Computer Science Summer 2020

Advisor: David C. Parkes

TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research

Research Council Member 2023 - 2025

Broadcom Corporation       San Diego, CA, USA
Software Development Engineer Intern in Bluetooth/NFC       Summer 2014

Selected Honors and Awards

• Invited Speaker, 2025 EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium, National Academy of Engineering, 2025
• Postdoctoral Fellowship, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath), 2023
  (declined due to work visa restrictions)
• Highlights Beyond EC, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023
• Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology, 2022
• Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2021
• SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 2020
• LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering, 2020
• CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association, 2020
• Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University, 2020
• Dean’s Grant, Princeton University Graduate School, 2016 – 2021
• First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University, 2016
• Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá, 2016
• Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira, 2016
• CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego, 2014
• Brazil Scientific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil, 2014
• 1^st place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video], 2013

Publications (Authors in alphabetical order) Google Scholar

Ferreira, M. V. X. (2026). “Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort”. In: 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Forthcoming.

Chitra, T., M. V. X. Ferreira, and K. Kulkarni (2024). “Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast”. In: 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Ed. by R. Böhme and L. Kiffer. Vol. 316. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 19:1–19:16. isbn: 978-3-95977-345-4. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19. url: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19.

Ferreira, M. V. X., A. Ganesh, J. Hourigan, H. Huh, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2024). “Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols”. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’24. New Haven, CT, USA.

Ferreira, M. V. X. and D. C. Parkes (2023). “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules”. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC ’23. Orlando, FL, USA. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.15569.

Essaidi, M., M. V. X. Ferreira, and S. M. Weinberg (2022). “Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions”. In: Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference. ITCS ’22. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14758.

Ferreira, M. V. X., Y. L. S. Hahn, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2022). “Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake”. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’22. Boulder, CO, USA. isbn: 9781450391504. doi: 10.1145/3490486.3538337. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.07996.

Ferreira, M. V. X., D. J. Moroz, D. C. Parkes, and M. Stern (2021). “Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market”. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies. AFT ’21. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.14144.

Ferreira, M. V. X. and S. M. Weinberg (2021). “Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’21.

— (2020). “Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments”. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’20. Virtual Event, Hungary. isbn: 9781450379755. doi: 10.1145/3391403.3399495. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01598.

Chattopadhyay, T., N. Feamster, M. V. X. Ferreira, D. Y. Huang, and S. M. Weinberg (2019). “Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities”. In: The World Wide Web Conference. WWW ’19. San Francisco, CA, USA. isbn: 9781450366748. doi: 10.1145/3308558.3313692. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10008.

Patents and Patent Applications

Ferreira, M.V.X., Parkes, D.C. Systems and Methods for Implementing a Verifiable Transaction Block on an Exchange. WIPO Patent Application WO2025006847A2, published January 2, 2025.

Teaching

University of Virginia

Harvard University - Co-Instructor

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant

Universidade Federal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant

University and Departmental Service

• Member, Computer Science Admissions Committee, 2024, 2025, 2026
• Faculty Lead, Research Interest Group on Foundations of Computer Science, Spring ’25 – present

PhD Committee Membership

• Bruno Mazorra Roig (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, December 2024)

Research Advising

• Janeet Bajracharya (2026 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Wish Shao (2025 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Gustavo Moreira (2025 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Utkarsh Goyal (2026 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Tamer Faysal El Aridi (2025 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Jou Kazys Barzdukas (2025 – Present, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Varun Vejalla (2024 – 2025, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on Latency Makes You Look Honest: Fully Undetectable Selfish Mining in Bitcoin.
• Yanchen Liu (2024 – 2025, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on VCG-based Mechanism in Multi-rounds Auction.
  First position: CS PhD student, University of Notre Dame.
• Mengqian Zhang (2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Verifiable Sequencing Rules for Multi-Dimensional Automated Market Makers.
  First position: Postdoc, Yale University.
• Michele Fabi (2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Decentralized Energy Markets.
  First position: Assistant Professor, Télécom Paris.
• Lily Johnson (2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Implementation of Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
  First position: Clankeronbase.
• Yotam Gafni (2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Transaction fee mechanisms.
  First position: Weizmann Institute.
• Lars Lien Ankile (Summer ’23 – May ’24, Harvard University. Boston, MA, USA.)
  Supervised research on I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior.
  First position: Ph.D. student, Stanford University.
• Hannah Huh (Spring ’22 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games.
  First position: Citadel.
• Anthony Hein (Fall ’21 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness.
  First position: Five Rings.
  Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize.
• Michelle Woo (Fall ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs.
  First position: Radix Trading LLC.
• Catherine Yu (Summer ’20 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake.
  First position: Stripe.
  Published at ACM EC 2022, 2023.
• Tinashe Handina (Summer ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility.
  First position: Ph.D. student, Caltech.

Talks and Events

1.

Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Designing DeFi Conference [Webpage]
New York City, NY. May 20-21st, 2026

2.

Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
New Applications for Blockchain in Energy + Environment
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ. April 29th, 2026

3.

When Cryptography Meets Strategic Platforms
EconCS @ Notre Dame Workshop
Notre Dame University
Notre Dame, IN. March 28th, 2026

4.

Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Decentralized Coding (DeCo) workshop
MIT
Boston, MA. March 23-24, 2026

5.

Pathways into the Academy
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ. March 3rd, 2026

6.

EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium
National Academy of Engineering
Bordeaux, France. October 20th to 23rd, 2025

7.

Credible Mechanisms for a Secure Web3 Platforms
AH Capital Management
NYC, New York. August 11th to 15th, 2025

8.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering
Miami, Florida. July 15-18, 2025

9.

Mechanism Design for Crypto economics
Crypto Academic Camp. Edge City
Heidelberg, California. June 15-19, 2025

10.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
Rutgers Theory Seminar. Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ. April 30, 2025

11.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
Oxford-Harvard Conference on Decentralized Finance and Market Microstructure [Webpage]
Oxford, UK. Jan 21st, 2025

12.

Academia, Industry, and Nontraditional Career Paths for Engineering Ph.D. (Panelist)
Ivy Collective for Inclusion in Engineering. Harvard University [Webpage]
Boston, MA. November 8, 2024

13.

Double auctions for cross-blockchain resource allocation
EC ’24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance. Yale School of Management
New Haven, CT. July 8, 2024

14.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Econ-DeFi Seminar. UC Santa Barbara.
Santa Barbara, CA. June 28, 2024

15.

Dynamic Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
EC ’24 Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Tutorial [Webpage]
June 25, 2024

16.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
Marketplace Innovation Workshop (MIW)
May 20, 2024

17.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
TLDR Conference. Columbia Business School
New York City. May 17, 2024

18.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference. Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN. April 19, 2024

19.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
Blockchain Lab. Stern School of Business. New York University
New York City, NY. April 12, 2024.

20.

I Wasn’t There: Applications of Blockchain to Privacy Preserving Reality Protection. Facilitator
DeCenter, Princeton University [Webpage]
Princeton, NJ. December 04, 2023

21.

Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Quest Lecture
Boston University Center for Computing and Data Sciences
Boston, MA. November 30, 2023

22.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Thalesians Seminar. International Association for Quantitative Finance
New York City, NY. October 03, 2023

23.

Future of Decentralization, AI & Computing Summit (Panelist)
UC Berkeley       [Video]
Berkeley, CA, August 27, 2023

24.

Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Blockchain + Economics workshop
August 15, 2023       [Video]
August 15, 2023

25.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
CryptoEconDay, CryptoEconLab       [Video]
Paris, France, July 9, 2023

26.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. Highlights Beyond EC
London, UK. June 23, 2023
London, UK. June 23, 2023

27.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. STOC 2023
Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023       [Video]
Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023

28.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative
Cambridge, MA. June 14, 2023

29.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics)
Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2023

30.

Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop
May 22, 2023
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains
May 22, 2023

31.

De Gruyter Digital Event
May 18, 2023       [Video]
Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis
May 18, 2023

32.

Research Day at the Metrograph
New York City, NY, May 16, 2023       [Video]
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
New York City, NY, May 16, 2023

33.

Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium
April 20, 2023       [Video]
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
April 20, 2023

34.

MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar
Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023

35.

Princeton University, Decenter Seminar
Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023

36.

University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023

37.

Tufts University, Department of Computer Science
Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023

38.

The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science
Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023

39.

Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar
Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023       [Video]
Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023

40.

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)
Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022

41.

Harvard University, EconCS Seminar
Boston, MA, November 4, 2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Boston, MA, November 4, 2022

42.

SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022
November 4, 2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
November 4, 2022

43.

UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference
Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022

44.

INFORMS Annual Meeting
Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022

45.

Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program)
Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022
Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022

46.

23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022       [Video]
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

47.

Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly
June 21, 2022
Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
June 21, 2022

48.

Harvard University, __LINK_0__
Boston, February 11, 2022 [Theory of Computation Seminar]
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Boston, February 11, 2022

49.

The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE)
December 15, 2021       [Video]
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
December 15, 2021

50.

3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
September 26-28, 2021       [Video]
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
September 26-28, 2021

51.

16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation
July 23, 2021
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
July 23, 2021

52.

22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 22, 2021       [Video]
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
July 22, 2021

53.

__LINK_0__
Princeton, May 2021 [Princeton University, Research Day]
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Princeton, May 2021

54.

Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
Princeton, April 2021
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Princeton, April 2021

55.

Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group
Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021
Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021

56.

INFORMS Annual Meeting
November 2020
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
November 2020

57.

21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 2020       [Video]
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
July 2020

58.

Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation)
Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020       [Video]
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020

59.

Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
Princeton, NJ, June 2019
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Princeton, NJ, June 2019

60.

Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar
Princeton, NJ, June 2017
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?
Princeton, NJ, June 2017

Media Coverage and Outreach

• “A New Era of DeFi with Application-Specific Sequencing.” Sorella Labs Blog, October 14, 2024. [Link]
• “Builder Stories: Lily Johnson On DEX Sequencing Rules.” Uniswap Foundation Blog, September 27, 2024. [Link]
• “The Future of Decentralization, AI, and Computing Summit: Cooperative AI with Decentralized Trust.” Berkeley RDI, August 27, 2023. https://rdi.berkeley.edu/events/decentralizationaisummit https://www.youtube.com/live/J5OmmgAdNg8?t=25816s
• “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.” CBER Symposium: DAOs and DEXs, April 20, 2023. https://www.cber-forum.org/symposiums https://youtu.be/34bUW6ypNx8
• “Auctions with Kshitij Kulkarni, Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Tarun. ” Zero Knowledge Podcast, Episode 269, March 22, 2023. https://zeroknowledge.fm/podcast/269/

Service

University Service

• Faculty Lead, Foundations of Computer Science, Research Interest Group, SEAS
• Admissions Committee, 2024-present

Diversity, Inclusion & Outreach

• Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University       2021
• Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science       August 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering       August 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering       August 2020
• Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School       October 2020
• Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom       2020, 2021, 2022
• Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University       2019, 2020, 2021
• Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science       2019
• LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University       2019, 2020
• Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University       2017
• Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University       2016, 2017