Research Interests

Economics and Computation, Security, Blockchains, AI

Education

Princeton University Princeton, NJ, USA

Master of Arts in Computer Science 2018

Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science 2022

Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg

Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems

Universidade Federal de Itajubá Itabira, MG, Brazil

B.S. (first class) in Computer Engineering 2016

University of California, San Diego San Diego, CA, USA

Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship 2014

Appointments

University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA, USA

Assistant Professor of Computer Science July 2024 - Present

Harvard University Boston, MA, USA

Lecturer in Computer Science Fall 2023

Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science Fall 2021 - Summer 2024

Fellow in Computer Science Summer 2020

Advisor: David C. Parkes

TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research

Research Council Member 2023 - 2025

Broadcom Corporation       San Diego, CA, USA
Software Development Engineer Intern in Bluetooth/NFC       Summer 2014

Selected Honors and Awards

• Invited Speaker, 2025 EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium, National Academy of Engineering, 2025
• Postdoctoral Fellowship, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath), 2023
  (declined due to work visa restrictions)
• Highlights Beyond EC, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023
• Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology, 2022
• Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2021
• SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 2020
• LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering, 2020
• CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association, 2020
• Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University, 2020
• Dean’s Grant, Princeton University Graduate School, 2016 – 2021
• First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University, 2016
• Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá, 2016
• Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira, 2016
• CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego, 2014
• Brazil Scientific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil, 2014
• 1^st place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video], 2013

Publications (reverse chronological order) Google Scholar

Ferreira, M. V. X. (2026). “Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort”. In: 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Forthcoming.

Chitra, T., M. V. X. Ferreira, and K. Kulkarni (2024). “Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast”. In: 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Ed. by R. Böhme and L. Kiffer. Vol. 316. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 19:1–19:16. isbn: 978-3-95977-345-4. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19. url: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19.

Ferreira, M. V. X., A. Ganesh, J. Hourigan, H. Huh, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2024). “Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols”. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’24. New Haven, CT, USA. doi: 10.1145/3670865.3673602. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673602.

Ferreira, M. V. X. and D. C. Parkes (2023). “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules”. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC ’23. Orlando, FL, USA. doi: 10.1145/3564246.3585233. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3564246.3585233.

Essaidi, M., M. V. X. Ferreira, and S. M. Weinberg (2022). “Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions”. In: Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference. ITCS ’22. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66. url: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66.

Ferreira, M. V. X., Y. L. S. Hahn, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2022). “Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake”. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’22. Boulder, CO, USA. isbn: 9781450391504. doi: 10.1145/3490486.3538337. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538337.

Ferreira, M. V. X., D. J. Moroz, D. C. Parkes, and M. Stern (2021). “Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market”. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies. AFT ’21. doi: 10.1145/3479722.3480991. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3479722.3480991.

Ferreira, M. V. X. and S. M. Weinberg (2021). “Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’21. doi: 10.1145/3465456.3467636. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467636.

— (2020). “Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments”. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’20. Virtual Event, Hungary. isbn: 9781450379755. doi: 10.1145/3391403.3399495. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399495.

Chattopadhyay, T., N. Feamster, M. V. X. Ferreira, D. Y. Huang, and S. M. Weinberg (2019). “Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities”. In: The World Wide Web Conference. WWW ’19. San Francisco, CA, USA. isbn: 9781450366748. doi: 10.1145/3308558.3313692. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3308558.3313692.

Patents and Patent Applications

Ferreira, M.V.X., Parkes, D.C. Systems and Methods for Implementing a Verifiable Transaction Block on an Exchange. WIPO Patent Application WO2025006847A2, published January 2, 2025.

Teaching

University of Virginia

Harvard University - Co-Instructor

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant

Universidade Federal de Itajubá - Teaching Assistant

University and Departmental Service

• Member, Computer Science Admissions Committee, 2024, 2025, 2026
• Faculty Lead, Research Interest Group on Foundations of Computer Science, Spring ’25 – Spring ’26

Thesis and Qualifying Exam Committees

• Bruno Mazorra Roig, Ph.D. Committee (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, December 2024)
• Varun Vejalla, M.S. Thesis Committee (University of Virginia, November 2025)
• Yuzhe Wang, M.S. Thesis Committee (University of Virginia, March 2026)
• Elizabeth Palmieri, Ph.D. Qualifying Exam Committee (University of Virginia, April 2026)
• Shiyu Li, Ph.D. Qualifying Exam Committee (University of Virginia, scheduled August 2026)

Research Advising

• Janeet Bajracharya (CS PhD at UVA, 2026 – Present)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Wish Shao (CS PhD at UVA, 2025 – Present)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Gustavo Moreira (CS PhD at UVA, 2025 – Present)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Utkarsh Goyal (CS B.S. at UVA, 2026 – Present)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Tamer Faysal El Aridi (CS B.S. at UVA, 2025 – Present)
  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Varun Vejalla (CS M.S. at UVA, 2024 – 2025)
  Supervised research on Latency Makes You Look Honest: Fully Undetectable Selfish Mining in Bitcoin.
• Yanchen Liu (2024 – 2025, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.)
  Supervised research on VCG-based Mechanism in Multi-rounds Auction.
  First position: CS PhD student, University of Notre Dame.
• Mengqian Zhang (2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Verifiable Sequencing Rules for Multi-Dimensional Automated Market Makers.
  First position: Postdoc, Yale University.
• Michele Fabi (2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Decentralized Energy Markets.
  First position: Assistant Professor, Télécom Paris.
• Lily Johnson (2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Implementation of Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
  First position: Clankeronbase.
• Yotam Gafni (2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.)
  Supervised research on Transaction fee mechanisms.
  First position: Weizmann Institute.
• Lars Lien Ankile (Summer ’23 – May ’24, Harvard University. Boston, MA, USA.)
  Supervised research on I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior.
  First position: Ph.D. student, Stanford University.
• Hannah Huh (Spring ’22 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games.
  First position: Citadel.
• Anthony Hein (Fall ’21 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness.
  First position: Five Rings.
  Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize.
• Michelle Woo (Fall ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs.
  First position: Radix Trading LLC.
• Catherine Yu (Summer ’20 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake.
  First position: Stripe.
  Published at ACM EC 2022, 2023.
• Tinashe Handina (Summer ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.)
  Supervised research on A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility.
  First position: Ph.D. student, Caltech.

Talks and Events

1.

Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Designing DeFi Conference [Webpage]
New York City, NY. May 20-21st, 2026

2.

Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
New Applications for Blockchain in Energy + Environment
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ. April 29th, 2026

3.

When Cryptography Meets Strategic Platforms
EconCS @ Notre Dame Workshop
Notre Dame University
Notre Dame, IN. March 28th, 2026

4.

Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Decentralized Coding (DeCo) workshop
MIT
Boston, MA. March 23-24, 2026

5.

Pathways into the Academy
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ. March 3rd, 2026

6.

EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium
National Academy of Engineering
Bordeaux, France. October 20th to 23rd, 2025

7.

Credible Mechanisms for a Secure Web3 Platforms
AH Capital Management
NYC, New York. August 11th to 15th, 2025

8.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering
Miami, Florida. July 15-18, 2025

9.

Mechanism Design for Crypto economics
Crypto Academic Camp. Edge City
Heidelberg, California. June 15-19, 2025

10.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
Rutgers Theory Seminar. Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ. April 30, 2025

11.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
Oxford-Harvard Conference on Decentralized Finance and Market Microstructure [Webpage]
Oxford, UK. Jan 21st, 2025

12.

Academia, Industry, and Nontraditional Career Paths for Engineering Ph.D. (Panelist)
Ivy Collective for Inclusion in Engineering. Harvard University [Webpage]
Boston, MA. November 8, 2024

13.

Double auctions for cross-blockchain resource allocation
EC ’24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance. Yale School of Management
New Haven, CT. July 8, 2024

14.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Econ-DeFi Seminar. UC Santa Barbara.
Santa Barbara, CA. June 28, 2024

15.

Dynamic Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
EC ’24 Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Tutorial [Webpage]
June 25, 2024

16.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
Marketplace Innovation Workshop (MIW)
May 20, 2024

17.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
TLDR Conference. Columbia Business School
New York City. May 17, 2024

18.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference. Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN. April 19, 2024

19.

I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
Blockchain Lab. Stern School of Business. New York University
New York City, NY. April 12, 2024.

20.

I Wasn’t There: Applications of Blockchain to Privacy Preserving Reality Protection. Facilitator
DeCenter, Princeton University [Webpage]
Princeton, NJ. December 04, 2023

21.

Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Quest Lecture
Boston University Center for Computing and Data Sciences
Boston, MA. November 30, 2023

22.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Thalesians Seminar. International Association for Quantitative Finance
New York City, NY. October 03, 2023

23.

Future of Decentralization, AI & Computing Summit (Panelist)
UC Berkeley       [Video]
Berkeley, CA, August 27, 2023

24.

Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses
Blockchain + Economics workshop       [Video]
August 15, 2023

25.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
CryptoEconDay, CryptoEconLab       [Video]
Paris, France, July 9, 2023

26.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Highlights Beyond EC
London, UK. June 23, 2023

27.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
STOC 2023       [Video]
Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023

28.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative
Cambridge, MA. June 14, 2023

29.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics)
Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2023

30.

Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains
Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop
May 22, 2023

31.

Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis
De Gruyter Digital Event       [Video]
May 18, 2023

32.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Research Day at the Metrograph       [Video]
New York City, NY, May 16, 2023

33.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium       [Video]
April 20, 2023

34.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar
Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023

35.

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Princeton University, Decenter Seminar
Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023

36.

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023

37.

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Tufts University, Department of Computer Science
Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023

38.

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science
Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023

39.

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar       [Video]
Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023

40.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)
Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022

41.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
Harvard University, EconCS Seminar
Boston, MA, November 4, 2022

42.

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022
November 4, 2022

43.

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference
Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022

44.

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
INFORMS Annual Meeting
Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022

45.

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program)
Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022

46.

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation       [Video]
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

47.

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly
June 21, 2022

48.

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar [Theory of Computation Seminar]
Boston, February 11, 2022

49.

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE)       [Video]
December 15, 2021

50.

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies       [Video]
September 26-28, 2021

51.

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation
July 23, 2021

52.

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation       [Video]
July 22, 2021

53.

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Princeton University, Research Day [Princeton University, Research Day]
Princeton, May 2021

54.

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
Princeton, April 2021

55.

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group
Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021

56.

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
INFORMS Annual Meeting
November 2020

57.

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation       [Video]
July 2020

58.

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation)       [Video]
Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020

59.

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
Princeton, NJ, June 2019

60.

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?
Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar
Princeton, NJ, June 2017

Media Coverage and Outreach

• “A New Era of DeFi with Application-Specific Sequencing.” Sorella Labs Blog, October 14, 2024. [Link]
• “Builder Stories: Lily Johnson On DEX Sequencing Rules.” Uniswap Foundation Blog, September 27, 2024. [Link]
• “The Future of Decentralization, AI, and Computing Summit: Cooperative AI with Decentralized Trust.” Berkeley RDI, August 27, 2023. https://rdi.berkeley.edu/events/decentralizationaisummit https://www.youtube.com/live/J5OmmgAdNg8?t=25816s
• “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.” CBER Symposium: DAOs and DEXs, April 20, 2023. https://www.cber-forum.org/symposiums https://youtu.be/34bUW6ypNx8
• “Auctions with Kshitij Kulkarni, Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Tarun. ” Zero Knowledge Podcast, Episode 269, March 22, 2023. https://zeroknowledge.fm/podcast/269/

Service

University Service

• Faculty Lead, Foundations of Computer Science, Research Interest Group, SEAS
• Admissions Committee, 2024-present

Diversity, Inclusion & Outreach

• Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University       2021
• Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science       August 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering       August 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering       August 2020
• Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School       October 2020
• Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom       2020, 2021, 2022
• Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University       2019, 2020, 2021
• Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science       2019
• LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University       2019, 2020
• Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University       2017
• Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University       2016, 2017