Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

Research Interests

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Economics and Computation, Security, Blockchains, AI

Education

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Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg

Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems

Appointments

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Advisor: David C. Parkes

TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research

Selected Honors and Awards

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• Invited Speaker, 2025 EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium, National Academy of Engineering2025
• Postdoctoral Fellowship, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath)2023
  (declined due to work visa restrictions)
• Highlights Beyond EC, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation2023
• Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology2022
• Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics2021
• SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences2020
• LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering2020
• CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association2020
• Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University2020
• Dean’s Grant, Princeton University Graduate School2016 – 2021
• First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University2016
• Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá2016
• Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira2016
• CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego2014
• Brazil Scientific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil2014
• 1^st place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video]2013

Publications

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reverse chronological order · Google Scholar

1. 10
   Ferreira, M. V. X. (2026). “Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort”. In: 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Ed. by A. Kiayias and M. Kyropoulou. Vol. 395. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 18:1–18:22. isbn: 978-3-95977-451-2. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.18. url: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.18.DOI ↗
2. 9
   Chitra, T., M. V. X. Ferreira, and K. Kulkarni (2024). “Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast”. In: 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Ed. by R. Böhme and L. Kiffer. Vol. 316. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 19:1–19:16. isbn: 978-3-95977-345-4. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19. url: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.19.DOI ↗
3. 8
   Ferreira, M. V. X., A. Ganesh, J. Hourigan, H. Huh, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2024). “Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols”. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’24. New Haven, CT, USA. doi: 10.1145/3670865.3673602. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673602.DOI ↗
4. 7
   Ferreira, M. V. X. and D. C. Parkes (2023). “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules”. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC ’23. Orlando, FL, USA. doi: 10.1145/3564246.3585233. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3564246.3585233.DOI ↗
5. 6
   Essaidi, M., M. V. X. Ferreira, and S. M. Weinberg (2022). “Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions”. In: Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference. ITCS ’22. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66. url: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66.DOI ↗
6. 5
   Ferreira, M. V. X., Y. L. S. Hahn, S. M. Weinberg, and C. Yu (2022). “Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake”. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’22. Boulder, CO, USA. isbn: 9781450391504. doi: 10.1145/3490486.3538337. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538337.DOI ↗
7. 4
   Ferreira, M. V. X., D. J. Moroz, D. C. Parkes, and M. Stern (2021). “Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market”. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies. AFT ’21. doi: 10.1145/3479722.3480991. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3479722.3480991.DOI ↗
8. 3
   Ferreira, M. V. X. and S. M. Weinberg (2021). “Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’21. doi: 10.1145/3465456.3467636. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467636.DOI ↗
9. 2
   — (2020). “Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments”. In: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC ’20. Virtual Event, Hungary. isbn: 9781450379755. doi: 10.1145/3391403.3399495. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399495.DOI ↗
10. 1
    Chattopadhyay, T., N. Feamster, M. V. X. Ferreira, D. Y. Huang, and S. M. Weinberg (2019). “Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities”. In: The World Wide Web Conference. WWW ’19. San Francisco, CA, USA. isbn: 9781450366748. doi: 10.1145/3308558.3313692. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/3308558.3313692.DOI ↗

Papers Under Submission

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1. 1
   Fabi, M., V. Nadkarni, L. Leone, and M. V. X. Ferreira (2025). “Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv:2512.24432.

Patents and Patent Applications

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1. 1
   Ferreira, M.V.X., Parkes, D.C. Systems and Methods for Implementing a Verifiable Transaction Block on an Exchange. WIPO Patent Application WO2025006847A2, published January 2, 2025.

Teaching

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University of Virginia

Harvard University - Co-Instructor

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant

Universidade Federal de Itajubá - Teaching Assistant

University and Departmental Service

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• Member, Computer Science Admissions Committee, 2024, 2025, 2026
• Faculty Lead, Research Interest Group on Foundations of Computer Science, Spring ’25 – Spring ’26
• Faculty Mentor, USOAR Program, 2026 – 2027
• Member, Computer Science Faculty Hiring Committee, 2026 – 2027

Thesis and Qualifying Exam Committees

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• Bruno Mazorra Roig, Ph.D. Committee (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, December 2024)
• Varun Vejalla, M.S. Thesis Committee (University of Virginia, November 2025)
• Yuzhe Wang, M.S. Thesis Committee (University of Virginia, March 2026)
• Elizabeth Palmieri, Ph.D. Qualifying Exam Committee (University of Virginia, April 2026)
• Shiyu Li, Ph.D. Qualifying Exam Committee (University of Virginia, scheduled August 2026)

Research Advising

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• Janeet BajracharyaCS PhD at UVA, 2026 – Present

  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Wish ShaoCS PhD at UVA, 2025 – Present

  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Gustavo MoreiraCS PhD at UVA, 2025 – Present

  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Salomon Owen-BadilloUVA undergraduate, USOAR 2026 – Present

  Supervised research on Energy Prophets: Online Prophet Inequality with Battery Storage.
• Utkarsh GoyalCS B.S. at UVA, 2026 – Summer 2026

  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Tamer Faysal El AridiCS B.S. at UVA, 2025 – Spring 2026

  Supervised research on Computer Science.
• Varun VejallaCS M.S. at UVA, 2024 – 2025

  Supervised research on Latency Makes You Look Honest: Fully Undetectable Selfish Mining in Bitcoin.
• Yanchen Liu2024 – 2025, UVA. Charlottesville, VA, USA.

  Supervised research on VCG-based Mechanism in Multi-rounds Auction.

  First position: CS PhD student, University of Notre Dame.
• Mengqian Zhang2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.

  Supervised research on Verifiable Sequencing Rules for Multi-Dimensional Automated Market Makers.

  First position: Postdoc, Yale University.
• Michele Fabi2024 – 2025, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.

  Supervised research on Decentralized Energy Markets.

  First position: Assistant Professor, Télécom Paris.
• Lily Johnson2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.

  Supervised research on Implementation of Verifiable Sequencing Rules.

  First position: Clankeronbase.
• Yotam Gafni2023 – 2024, TLDR: The latest in DeFi Research.

  Supervised research on Transaction fee mechanisms.

  First position: Weizmann Institute.
• Lars Lien AnkileSummer ’23 – May ’24, Harvard University. Boston, MA, USA.

  Supervised research on I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior.

  First position: Ph.D. student, Stanford University.
• Hannah HuhSpring ’22 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.

  Supervised research on Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games.

  First position: Citadel.
• Anthony HeinFall ’21 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.

  Supervised research on Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness.

  First position: Five Rings.
  Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize.
• Michelle WooFall ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.

  Supervised research on Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs.

  First position: Radix Trading LLC.
• Catherine YuSummer ’20 – May ’22, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.

  Supervised research on Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake.

  First position: Stripe.
  Published at ACM EC 2022, 2023.
• Tinashe HandinaSummer ’20 – May ’21, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA.

  Supervised research on A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility.

  First position: Ph.D. student, Caltech.

Talks and Events

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1. BDePIN-Energy 2026: Workshop on Blockchain & DePIN for Decentralized Energy Systems (Workshop Co-Chair)
   BRAINS 2026, 8th Conference on Blockchain Research & Applications for Innovative Networks and Services [Program] [Flyer]
   Florence, Italy. October 13, 2026
2. Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
   8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026) [Program]
   London School of Economics
   London, UK. October 9, 2026
3. Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
   Designing DeFi Conference [Webpage]
   New York City, NY. May 20-21st, 2026
4. Automated Market Making for Energy Sharing
   New Applications for Blockchain in Energy + Environment
   Princeton University
   Princeton, NJ. April 29th, 2026
5. When Cryptography Meets Strategic Platforms
   EconCS @ Notre Dame Workshop
   Notre Dame University
   Notre Dame, IN. March 28th, 2026
6. Credible Auctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
   Decentralized Coding (DeCo) workshop
   MIT
   Boston, MA. March 23-24, 2026
7. Pathways into the Academy
   Princeton University
   Princeton, NJ. March 3rd, 2026
8. EU-US Frontiers of Engineering Symposium
   National Academy of Engineering
   Bordeaux, France. October 20th to 23rd, 2025
9. Credible Mechanisms for a Secure Web3 Platforms
   AH Capital Management
   NYC, New York. August 11th to 15th, 2025
10. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
    SIAM Conference on Financial Mathematics and Engineering
    Miami, Florida. July 15-18, 2025
11. Mechanism Design for Crypto economics
    Crypto Academic Camp. Edge City
    Heidelberg, California. June 15-19, 2025
12. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
    Rutgers Theory Seminar. Rutgers University
    New Brunswick, NJ. April 30, 2025
13. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
    Oxford-Harvard Conference on Decentralized Finance and Market Microstructure [Webpage]
    Oxford, UK. Jan 21st, 2025
14. Academia, Industry, and Nontraditional Career Paths for Engineering Ph.D. (Panelist)
    Ivy Collective for Inclusion in Engineering. Harvard University [Webpage]
    Boston, MA. November 8, 2024
15. Double auctions for cross-blockchain resource allocation
    EC ’24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance. Yale School of Management
    New Haven, CT. July 8, 2024
16. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Econ-DeFi Seminar. UC Santa Barbara.
    Santa Barbara, CA. June 28, 2024
17. Dynamic Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
    EC ’24 Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Tutorial [Webpage]
    June 25, 2024
18. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
    Marketplace Innovation Workshop (MIW)
    May 20, 2024
19. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
    TLDR Conference. Columbia Business School
    New York City. May 17, 2024
20. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
    NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference. Vanderbilt University
    Nashville, TN. April 19, 2024
21. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior
    Blockchain Lab. Stern School of Business. New York University
    New York City, NY. April 12, 2024.
22. I Wasn’t There: Applications of Blockchain to Privacy Preserving Reality Protection. Facilitator
    DeCenter, Princeton University [Webpage]
    Princeton, NJ. December 04, 2023
23. Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Quest Lecture
    Boston University Center for Computing and Data Sciences
    Boston, MA. November 30, 2023
24. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Thalesians Seminar. International Association for Quantitative Finance
    New York City, NY. October 03, 2023
25. Future of Decentralization, AI & Computing Summit (Panelist)
    UC Berkeley [Video]
    Berkeley, CA, August 27, 2023
26. Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses
    Blockchain + Economics workshop [Video]
    August 15, 2023
27. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    CryptoEconDay, CryptoEconLab [Video]
    Paris, France, July 9, 2023
28. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Highlights Beyond EC
    London, UK. June 23, 2023
29. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    STOC 2023 [Video]
    Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023
30. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative
    Cambridge, MA. June 14, 2023
31. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics)
    Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2023
32. Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains
    Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop
    May 22, 2023
33. Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis
    De Gruyter Digital Event [Video]
    May 18, 2023
34. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Research Day at the Metrograph [Video]
    New York City, NY, May 16, 2023
35. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium [Video]
    April 20, 2023
36. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar
    Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023
37. Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
    Princeton University, Decenter Seminar
    Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023
38. Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
    University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science
    Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023
39. Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
    Tufts University, Department of Computer Science
    Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023
40. Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
    The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science
    Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023
41. Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
    Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar [Video]
    Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023
42. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)
    Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022
43. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    Harvard University, EconCS Seminar
    Boston, MA, November 4, 2022
44. Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
    SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022
    November 4, 2022
45. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
    UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference
    Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022
46. Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
    INFORMS Annual Meeting
    Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022
47. Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
    Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program)
    Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022
48. Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
    23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video]
    University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022
49. Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
    Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly
    June 21, 2022
50. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
    Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar [Theory of Computation Seminar]
    Boston, February 11, 2022
51. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
    The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE) [Video]
    December 15, 2021
52. Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
    3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies [Video]
    September 26-28, 2021
53. Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market
    16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation
    July 23, 2021
54. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
    22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video]
    July 22, 2021
55. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
    Princeton University, Research Day [Princeton University, Research Day]
    Princeton, May 2021
56. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
    Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
    Princeton, April 2021
57. Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems
    Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group
    Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021
58. Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
    INFORMS Annual Meeting
    November 2020
59. Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
    21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video]
    July 2020
60. Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
    Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation) [Video]
    Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020
61. Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
    Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day
    Princeton, NJ, June 2019
62. Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?
    Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar
    Princeton, NJ, June 2017

Media Coverage and Outreach

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• “A New Era of DeFi with Application-Specific Sequencing.” Sorella Labs Blog, October 14, 2024. [Link]
• “Builder Stories: Lily Johnson On DEX Sequencing Rules.” Uniswap Foundation Blog, September 27, 2024. [Link]
• “The Future of Decentralization, AI, and Computing Summit: Cooperative AI with Decentralized Trust.” Berkeley RDI, August 27, 2023. https://rdi.berkeley.edu/events/decentralizationaisummit https://www.youtube.com/live/J5OmmgAdNg8?t=25816s
• “Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.” CBER Symposium: DAOs and DEXs, April 20, 2023. https://www.cber-forum.org/symposiums https://youtu.be/34bUW6ypNx8
• “Auctions with Kshitij Kulkarni, Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Tarun. ” Zero Knowledge Podcast, Episode 269, March 22, 2023. https://zeroknowledge.fm/podcast/269/

Service

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Diversity, Inclusion & Outreach

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• Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University2021
• Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer ScienceAugust 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of EngineeringAugust 2021
• Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of EngineeringAugust 2020
• Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate SchoolOctober 2020
• Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom2020, 2021, 2022
• Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University2019, 2020, 2021
• Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science2019
• LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University2019, 2020
• Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University2017
• Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University2016, 2017